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Legacies, Barriers and Prerequisites*
I. Introduction
Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union the successor states-have launched
a number of initiatives to be accepted as new members in international fora.
1 Such
efforts have materialised in the two Bretton Woods institutions which co-operate with
CIS governments to support transformation policies by financial, economic, and
technical assistance and to improve the effectiveness of reforms. They have
witnessed in the OECD which endorsed the extension of development assistance to
the Central Asian countries within the CIS, and they have also been observed in the
international trading system. Applications for full membership in the GATT have been
tabled by major CIS states including the Russian Federation (RF), Ukraine, and
Belarus, and it is expected that all remaining countries will follow suit.
Designing national trade policies according to GATT rules and submitting trade
measures under GATT discipline has an important role to play in the transformation
process. A successful design and discipline would strengthen the credibility of the
entire transformation process, improve transparency and predictability of import
market access and export policies, and, finally, would have spread effects to other
reform policies, for instance, price liberalisation and institution-building. However, the
challenges are at least as large as the prospective gains. As entirely isolated
command economies over more than seventy years, CIS states face a- legacy of
paramount obstacles. Section II discusses two segments of obstacles, i.e.
dependence on intra-ClS sourcing and export markets, and severe trade policy
distortions and inconsistencies with international trading rules. To depart from the
legacy of the old system, requires a discussion of both possible roots embedded in
the system and still existing barriers. Section III draws upon three elements of inertia
• This paper reports on research undertaken in a project on prerequisites of integrating the former
Soviet Union into the world economy. Financial support received from the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach Stiftung are gratefully acknowledged. Ulrich Hiemenz provided helpful comments to
an earlier draft.
1 The three Baltic states are non-member states of the Community of Independent States (CIS) and,
therefore, have been disregarded in the following. They have initiated similar attempts to integrate
into the international economic order and are accepted as a group sui generis as concerns their
decoupling from the ex-USSR monetary and customs union. They enjoy privileged treatment as
partner countries in regional co-operation and trade arrangements with the European Union (EU)
relative to the CIS states.and persistance. Rent-seeking behaviour of individuals in the nomenklatura is
identified as a powerful force of inertia followed by "natural" barriers such as disorder
in separating internal from external trade and incoherence in overall transformation
policies. Section IV presents a number of cross-road decisions which have to be
taken by CIS states in order to facilitate the transition towards rational, efficient and
GATT-consistent trade policies. A major impediment against introducing and
implementing autonomous trade policies coherent with national interests are some
CIS specific "constraints", for instance, the dominant role of the RF both in the
monetary and real sector. Economically, the RF constitutes the "large country" case
for the other CIS states. Through its own policy, it transmits cross-border spillovers
to neighbouring countries. Trade policy-related aspects of such specific constraints
being unique for the CIS area are raised in Section V. Section VI concludes on the
results.
il. The Legacy of the Command Economy
1. Characteristics of Past Trading Patterns and Their Changes in the Post-USSR
Period
a. Inward orientation and dependence on Intra-USSR Trade
The command economy system of the USSR entailed a strong element of autarky.
Self-reliance dominated not only vis-a-vis market economies but also in relation to
other CMEA countries. Extra-USSR trade relative to GDP was only about 8 per cent
for the average of the former USSR compared to almost 25 per cent for a reference
area comprising similarly fully integrated sub-entities, e.g., Canada with its provinces
[Odling-Smee, Table 1]. Due to its oil trade, the RF though subject to the large
country bias against high trade/GDP shares even exceeded the USSR average by
trading more than 9 per cent of its GDP extra-regionally. All other former USSR
republics were even more delinked from non-USSR trade with shares ranging
between 5 and 7 per cent. Except for the RF which traded less than 60 per cent
intra-regionally, all other former republics showed shares of intra-USSR trade in their
total trade in the range of 80-90 per cent. In this network, the RF was the focal
trading partner. It served as the major export market and, even more importantly, as
the most important sourcing market. The latter was and still is especially valid as
concerns energy. The three largest republics (in terms of economic size) next to the
RF, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, imported about 90-97 per cent of total energy
imports from the former USSR from the RF.
2 Given highly energy-intensive
2 See for a detailed analysis of intra-USSR trading patterns in 1990 [Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992].,production and lack of alternative sources in the short and medium run, energy
supply and its bill is at the forefront of intra-CIS economic relations.
A major institutional, factor influencing trade in the former Soviet Union was the
organisation of economic ministries along branch lines which led to a strong
fragmentarisation of responsibilities for trade relations. In the former RF, for
instance, forty-nine institutions, most of them were ministries, accounted for the
entire exports in convertible and non-convertible currencies [Goskomstat RSFSR,
1991]. Reportedly, this structure has often favoured inter-republican trade within a
ministry over intra-republican trade across ministries [IMF, 1991: 193]. Such
preference could be explained by savings in transaction costs which probably were
lower within ministries than between ministries. Furthermore, under rent-seeking
behaviour, public choice theory would underline incentives to expand mtra-ministerial
relations in competition between ministries for competence and resources.
However, the bias towards maximising intra-ministerial transactions in inter-
republican relations would not have been effective if production plants were evenly
split across the entire former Soviet Union. This was not the case, however, as it is
well-known that individual plants in the former USSR accounted for the lion's share if
not for the entire production of a single product [Sagers, Heleniak, Qunlbp, 1991:
190-193]. Another characteristic was location. Ignorance of transaction costs (e.g.
costs of transportation) led planners to locate industries in remote places, such as a
cane sugar refinery in Kyrghyzstan processing raw sugar from Cuba or an aluminium
smelter in Tajikistan catering to bauxite imported from Guinea [Pomfret, 1993: 3].
Both concentration and location when imposed down to the level of individual
intermediates and spare parts were a driving force of strong economic
interdependence. Given the a priori assumption that mega-plants were the rule and
gave rise to "overspecialisation", empirical tests between degrees of concentration in
the former USSR and, as a "normaliser", in the United States were run by Brown,
Ickes, and Rhyterman, 1993]. The tests, albeit on a four digit industry level, led to a
rejection of this hypothesis of "overspecialisation". Yet, as they could not be
deepened down to the product level, there is only episodic plausibility that
concentration on the product level was indeed very high in the former USSR and
that, therefore, specialisation was of intra-branch rather than inter-branch nature.
b. Price distortions in intra-USSR trade
 r
Distortions between world market prices and domestic prices through product-
specific subsidies and indirect taxes were key elements of trading between republics
and were vehicles of massive indirect transfers. According to Goskomstat surveys,primary and secondary energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metals and machine building
were underpriced relative to world markets prices, while consumer goods, food
products, and other agricultural goods were overpriced. Average world
market/domestic market price ratios ranged between 2.7 (oil and gas) and 0.33 (light
industry) [Orlowski, 1993a: Table 2]. Underpricing exports and overpricing imports
were equivalent to a massive indirect transfer of income from the exporting and
importing republics to those which imported underpriced goods and exported
overpriced items. The sectoral pattern of indirect transfers was such that in 1990
about 61 per cent of subsidised exports were in oil and gas while about 45 per cent
of overpriced imports were in light industries [op. cit, Table 2]. The RF was the only
"double donor" republic in exports (oil and gas) and imports (light industries). Eight
former republics were "double recipients" by net importing subsidised goods and
exporting overpriced goods while only the two other energy exporters (Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan) were both in the position of both donor and recipient; the latter as
exporter of overpriced non-oil and gas. On a net basis, Turkmenistan joined the RF
as the second net donor. The most important individual flow of indirect transfers was
from the RF to the Ukraine as more than 50 per cent of the RF net transfers in oil
and gas accrued to the Ukraine. RF net transfers have been estimated to about 3.7
per cent of GDP and 10.8 per cent for Turkmenistan while Moldova received 24 per
cent of its GDP in terms such transfers. The extent of such transfers became
transparent as huge balance of payments deficits when prices were raised and when
the Ruble Zone disintegrated. The RF tried to channel such transfers by converting
them into overdraft credit ceilings but national Central Banks of the other CIS were
difficult to discipline as they themselves issued credits and urged upon the RF
Central Bank to honour them. Mutual interdependence between RF companies and
companies of other CIS was an important leverage of the other CIS states to claim
for credit expansion to be honoured by the Russian Central Bank. Under conditions
of a currency union, official overdraft credit ceilings and tacit honouring of unilateral
credit expansion in the other CIS were found to be a major source of inflation in the
RF. At the same time, official credits for paying the oil bill, for instance, became a
political instrument of RF patronage. Credit ceilings were more generously issued in
favour of the privileged partner states Kazakhstan (enjoying a virtually unlimited
overdraft credit) and Belarus (receiving a long-term interest-free credit to pay for an
overdraft credit) than of Ukraine, for instance [Orlowski, 1993b]. In the course of
1993, the Russian Central Bank tightened credit ceilings for all CIS states
substantially. In doing so, it accelerated the ongoing process of monetary
disintegration promoted by the CIS states by introducing national currencies as sole
legal tender.c. Past-USSR developments in CIS trade
As a result to monetary disintegration (the dissolution of the Ruble Zone), the real
sector was bound to disintegrate, too, irrespective of newly established trade barriers
such as export bans and export quotas. As in all other issues, the RF played a
central role. Given its net donor position, intra-CIS trade declined when the RF
denied to continue subsidising its exports and overpricing its imports as well as
stockpiling worthless assets in terms of debts of other CIS states. How much inter-
CIS trade declined, however, is almost impossible to assess as the reporting system
broke simultaneously with the decline of officially registered trade. But even if the
reporting system had stayed in place, it is unlikely that it would have captured the
entire intra-CIS trade. Considerable amounts of inter-company barter trade escaped
statistical documentation.
Detailed information on the extent of decline in intra-CIS trade by goods and states is
only available for few countries (Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix Table 1) . Except for
gas, the RF reduced its deliveries in virtually all products and to all states.
Interestingly enough, trade often fell more than production suggesting a trend
towards autarky. Declines were generally more pronounced in finished goods (for
instance, passenger cars and trucks) than in commodities. For the latter group of
products, both bilateral inter-governmental agreements as well as delivery contracts
negotiated between companies aimed at stabilising access to essential commodities
and intermediates. However, while the last two columns in Table 1 even highlight few
"excess" fulfilments, the majority of agreements and contracts fell short ;of meeting
the target deliveries.
3 The sharper drop in trade in finished goods reflects the
extreme vulnerability of the inherited inter-company network in spare parts and
intermediates to the collapse to production and distribution of very few items.
Declining Russian timber exports to the Ukraine, for instance, caused a major drop
of production in the construction industry of the Ukraine, and, subsequently, a
decline of exports of semi-manufactures in this industry to the RF.
3 This is also documented in Appendix Table 2 in which fulfilment ratios of supplier contrasts
between Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the one hand, and the other CIS states as
importers on the other hand are presented.Table 1 - Russian Exports to CIS States, 1990-1992




























































































Source: Finansovije Izvestija, 15.-21.5.1993, P. II.
Table 2 - Selected Features of Changes in Russian Exports to CIS States (1992 changes














































































Source: See Table 1.As concerns regional patterns of decline, transcaucasian states seem to have been
most strongly cut off from Russian sources compared to Ukraine, Belarus, and also
Kazakhstan. The Central Asian countries range in between the two groups. A clear
trend for these countries cannot be identified, neither by states nor by products.
Given the different degrees of importance of the CIS states as suppliers of products
to the RF, this regional patterns seems plausible. With ongoing bilateralisation of
trade relations, those CIS states seem to have had a relatively good bargaining
power vis-a-vis the RF which either figured prominently as suppliers of essential
items (Ukraine in some heavy industries and agriculture) or were politically privileged
as compatriots to sustaining monetary integration with the RF (Kazakhstan, Belarus).
Identifying clear trends in CIS trade with the rest of the world is impeded by two
problems mainly. First, enormous instabilities in exchange rates make it difficult to
specify the price vector over the 1990-93 period. Second, it was not earlier than
1992 that CIS states were included in the reporting system of OECD countries. For
Japan, for instance, trade with individual CIS is available since February 1992; for
the EC it is May 1992. In spite of establishing a reporting system, reexports of
Russian goods via other CIS states cannot yet be excluded. Rules of origin are not
controlled and borders are often open. This explains why in day-to-day trade policy
measures, the CIS states are still treated as a unit. In August 1993, for instance, the
EC imposed a single quota on aluminium imports from all former Soviet republics
though EC trade statistics had already started to document trade with individual CIS
separately.
Given such empirical problems, the highlights of recent developments in CIS trade
can be summarised as follows:
(a) In 1992, the trade volume of the RF had dropped to 50 per cent of the 1990 level
[PlanEcon, 10 March 1993: 35]. Over the entire period, imports declined more
strongly than exports. It seems, that this wedge has become deeper in 1993.
During the first seven months of 1993, Russian exports in US$ (12.4 bill.) are
reported to have increased by 2.6 per cent over the same period 1992 while
imports (10.3 bill.) had declined by 48 per cent [Rossijskaja Gaz.eta, 1993].
Declining imports are explained by deteriorating access to OECD credits as well
as by additional border charges introduced in 1993 (average tariff rate of 15 per
cent, turnover tax, special excise taxes). Exchange rate-induced incentives to
reduce imports were not found to be relevant as the real exchange rate during
the first half of 1993 has been estimated to be at the similar level as May-September 1992 [Finansovije Izvestija, No. 35, 2 July 1993; DIW, Dritter Bericht,
September 1993: 26-27].
(b) Regional shifts in trade are to the favour of European OECD countries. In 1992,
for instance, total former-USSR exports to this region amounted to 88 per cent
(87 per cent in 1991) of entire exports to the OECD while import shares are
slightly lower (75 per cent) probably because of tied credit-based imports from
North America [OECD Trade Statistics, Series A].
(c) Both the decline in domestic industrial production and the lack of international
competitiveness in manufactured goods has led to a commodity bias in the
sectoral structure of CIS trade. Contrary to Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs)
which tightened budget constraints imposed upon loss-making companies, the
decline of production in the CIS
4 does not emerge primarily from the
transformation process. In many cases, such a process has not yet really started
as low unemployment figures and high subsidies continuously paid to obsolete
companies suggest. Instead, it is the breakdown of the payments system, the
establishment of trade barriers, difficulties in transportation and distribution, and
the dissolution of the sophisticated inter-company sourcing network which
basically responsible for the decline. Internationally, these difficulties made
access to CIS manufactured goods highly unreliable, apart from inherent
problems as the high energy intensity of many CIS goods. Furthermore, the
decline of the military-industrial complex which was a major absorber of
commodities (aluminium, ferrous metals) contributed to excess production of raw
commodities or processed commodities in many CIS. Companies therefore
started to expand exports of such commodities, regardless whether other
companies followed the same strategy. Such behaviour has made export
structures of some CIS states fairly similar. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Tajikistan, for instance, are basically exporting two commodities to the EC, raw
cotton and raw aluminium, while Kyrghyzstan and Kazakhstan concentrate on
ferrous and non-ferrous metals and metal processing [Langhammer, 1993). Such
increasing similarities in export patterns have given rise to defensive reactions in
Western Europe, as shown by the EC imposing a common import quota on
aluminium from all CIS state in 1993. Low-income CIS with few companies only
are particularly prone to export commodities as their diversification potential is
marginal and as they do not dispose of products such as energy products which
4 The decline of industrial production has been estimated in the range of 9 per cent (Ukraine) to 19
per cent (RF) for 1992 with an average decline of 18 per cent for all CIS. The decline in 1993 was
in the range of 7-24 per cent.are demanded in OECD countries. The availability of pipelines and other
transportation technology benefits the RF in exporting gas to Western Europe
while its trade with Japan, for instance, concentrates on other commodities (coal,
ferrous metals, diamonds).
(d) Industrial goods still figure prominently in trade with some non-OECD countries in
which energy-intensive capital goods and ex-USSR technology continue to find
their market niches. In 1992, for instance, almost 45 per cent 6f Chinese imports
from the RF consisted of machinery and transport equipment. Apart from such
capital-intensive exports, EC data on imports from the RF, Belarus and to some
extent also Ukraine, lend support to the hope that labour-intensive industries
(textiles, clothing, footwear, export goods, travel goods) will benefit from special
trade provisions of the EC (e.g. the GSP and outward processing quotas) in
future.
2. Main Characteristics of Post-USSR Trade Policies in CIS States
a. The legacy from the command economy
To understand the rationale of post-USSR trade policies in the CIS states, it is
necessary to recall the basic legacy from the period of central planning concerning
international trade of the former Soviet Union. There were basically three pillars.
First, and most importantly, decisions on allocation and distribution always relied on
physical quantities. This had important implications for the external sector, as
quantitative restrictions (quotas, bans) instead of pricing interventions (tariffs, levies)
were adequate instruments to guarantee that physical import and export volumes did
not deviate from the target volumes laid out in central planning. Tariffs would have
not fulfilled this prerequisite.
The second legacy is priority given to controls of the export side than of the import
side. As mentioned above, former Soviet Union republics were relatively isolated
from international trade, in comparison to other CMEA states. Imports from market
economies did not play any role as concerns consumer goods, and access to capital
goods was strictly controlled by OECD countries for security reasons (COCOM-list).
Exports, however, were essential for gaining revenues in hard currency and, thus,
were subject to strict supervision. Such supervision was the more important as
Soviet Union exports were understood by the controllers as "strategic" for the
Western economies, i.e. non-ferrous and ferrous metals, and primary energy. Given
this legacy, it does not come as a surprise that in the early stage of transformation,
the design of trade policy again starts from the export side.10
The third legacy is bilateralism. Trade with any foreign partner, often statals and
para-statals, was subject to contract-based relations, barter trade, buy-back
arrangements and other institutional forms. Customers were carefully selected for
political reasons so that bilateralism was a normal instrument of policy making and
not a violation of rules or an exception. No multilateral framework disciplined the
former Soviet Union, and one may even assume that OECD governments welcomed
bilateralism as it helped them to control trade relations with the Communist bloc.
Furthermore, bilateralism was also applied within the CMEA.
The derivatives of these three pillars were strong state interference and
discrimination, still very much alive in post-1989 trade policies.
b. Constituting factors of CIS trade policies
CIS trade policies in early 1992 were characterised as "near chaos"
[Michaolopoulos, Tarr, 1992: 4]. There is little evidence that such judgement has
warranted revision since. The overriding principle of discrimination takes a large part
in such chaos, as it is applied between sectors and industries, between trading
partners, and even between companies. To start with discrimination between
sectors. CIS governments issue licences and quotas on the import as well as on the
export side following political rather than economic targets. Tariffs do not yet play a
major role. In the RF, for instance, the coverage of the MFN import tariff rates
ranging between 5 and 15 per cent is very low, due to a large number of such
exemptions. The Ministry of Finance has estimated that the import tariffs will apply to
just 2.7 bill. US-$ of imports in 1993 (out of estimated total imports of 41.4 bill.)
[Russian Economic Trends, No. 3, 1993: 43]. The government decides which
"essential" imports come under the so-called centralised import scheme and thus are
eligible for subsidisation. Under this scheme, the government purchases imports and
resells them domestically for rubles. For most of these goods, the ruble price is less
than the prevailing market exchange rate. One fifth of centralised imports are cash-
financed and the rest were credit-financed. A further discriminatory element is that
the government issues a specific list for subsidy coefficients which apply to each
good. In the RF, average subsidy coefficients for commodities ranged from 0.68 in
the first half of 1993 to 0.44 in the second half. Such import subsidies are equivalent
to a multiple exchange rate system with an appreciating exchange rate for the
import-competing sector. They contribute to rendering the import tariff protection
obsolete and introduce a cross-sector distorting element into the trade regime, as
there has not been an equivalent subsidy for investment goods. All other CIS states
proceed along the similar lines: They have introduced tariff schemes which are not
applied or remain ineffective because of import licensing and discretionary decisions11
on so-called essential and non-essential goods. Import controls receive a crucial
impulse from binding foreign exchange shortages in extra-CIS trade and from ruble
credit rationing of the largest donor in intra-CIS trade, the RF, on which most CIS
states are heavily dependent with respect to energy imports. For 1992, it has been
estimated that 90 per cent of subsidies conceded by the RF in intra-CIS trade came
from oil and gas. Ukraine (net subsidy recipient of 4.3 bill. US$) and Belarus (2.4 bill.
US$) were the largest beneficiaries.
Discrimination is even more pervasive on the export side given the fear to lose
valuable national resources to foreigners and to forego export earnings. Such
practices unnecessarily constrain access to hard currencies, as export licences for
primary commodities are discretionarily and selectively issued. They impede export
diversification toward manufactures and reinforce the existing bias against exporting
manufactures which is due to the vulnerability of the manufacturing sector to the
collapse of the inter-state supplier network. In addition to licences, export taxes are
levied in extra-CIS trade. In some CIS states, they include a large spread (for
instance, in Belarus between 1 and 30 per cent, Ukraine: 5-30 per cent) thus adding
a further element of discrimination. Reforms have been announced, however. In the
RF, all quotas except those on oil, gas and certain oil derivatives are to eliminated by
the end of 1993, and the remaining quotas are to be phased out by the end of 1994.
The stumbling bloc will be to implement such reform.
While exports should theoretically benefit from undervalued currencies (measured in
purchasing power parities), such prospects are de facto paralysed by quantitative
restrictions and obligations to surrender parts of the export earnings to the Central
Banks at an overvalued ruble rate. In Belarus, for instance, complex surrender
requirements amounted to 43 per cent of foreign export proceeds [IMF, Economic
Reviews, Belarus, No. 11, September 1993: 29]. To evade surrendering, companies
resort to barter, retain export revenues or ask customers to pay directly to a foreign
supplier of the exporter. For the RF, it is reported that the surrender of foreign
exchange was equal to an export tax of more than 5 per cent of total revenues and
that underreporting of export revenues reached roughly 25 per cent of the
convertible currency export volume [Kiselyov, 1993: 7]. In general, foreign
investment is reported to be strongly discouraged by restrictive practices of local and
central authorities against exporting commodities because such exports are often the
only way to finance equity capital in kind (through capital goods imports).
The second type of discrimination refers to countries. Such discrimination is primarily
applied in intra-CIS trade which is largely subject to bilateral inter-state agreements.12
In Belarus, for instance, 44 per cent of exports and 58 per cent of imports was
handled through bilateral inter-state agreements during the first half of 1993
[unpublished Gosekonomplan data cited in DIW, Die wirtschaftliche Lage
WeiRruBlands, 1993: 13]. Such agreements prevail in a number of CIS states (see
Appendix Table 2 for Belarus, the RF, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)'and were often
incompletely fulfilled. They suffer from ineffectiveness as they require checks of rules
of origin which cannot be made under the conditions of trade policy disorder. A
further element of discrimination has emerged from exempting Russian imports from
CIS from the VAT and other indirect taxes while imports from non-CIS sources are
charged with such taxes [IMF, Economic Reviews, Russian Federation, No. 8, July
1993].
Intra-CIS trade discrimination also stems from politically motivated uneven ruble
credit expansion of the Russian Central Bank which is reported to have discriminated
against the Ukraine, for instance, and in favour of Belarus and Kazakhstan. Belarus
received a long-term interest-free loan to repay a short-term overdraft credit
(Izvestija, 8 July, 1993) while Kazakhstan also enjoyed such preferential treatment
through overdraft credits [Ekonomika i zizn
1, 1993, No. 15]. Reportedly, the Russian
Central Bank often used the practice of temporarily freezing bilateral corresponding
accounts, for example, with Kazakhstan. In order to ensure payments, banking and
financial institutions developed equivalents of clearing systems paying debts of
Kazakh companies to Russian suppliers with the money of Russian companies
purchasing from Kazakhstan. Clearing schemes allowed financial intermediaries to
establish a quasi exchange rate between the ruble in The RF and the ruble in
Kazakhstan. In early 1993, the rate has been reported to fluctuate around 1.3 rubles
in Kazakhstan for a ruble in the RF [Kiselyov, 1993:10]. Such treatment was phased
out after Kazakhstan decided to issue its own currency in November 1993.
Country-specific discrimination in trade with non-CIS states arises if partnership
agreements with the EC and financial assistance (for instance, subsidised export
credit schemes with EC countries as Hermes in Germany) induce CIS states'
governments to issue export and import licences preferably for trade with donor
countries.
The third facet of discrimination in trade is company-specific. In intra-CIS trade, it is
reflected in supplier contracts between companies. Compared to inter-state treaties,
enterprise-to-enterprise trade may be preferable as it is more consistent with market
mechanism. However, such trade mainly occurs between large state-owned
conglomerates conducted by managers from the old nomenclatura. They aim at13
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preserving the pre-1989 contacts as long as possible but face a higher risk of
nonpayment than in inter-state treaties. Therefore, risk-averting behaviour leads to
barter trade and. is conducive to cement production and trading patterns which would
be challenged and even become obsolete under market-oriented conditions. It
cannot be excluded that preserving traditional links implies an effective
discrimination against newcomers from the slowly emerging private sector. Given the
fact that the fulfilment ratios of such contracts are officially documented next to the
inter-state agreements it is very likely that they receive open support from
governments. Therefore, they should not be confused with inter-enterprise links in
market economies but should be looked upon basically as a microeconomic pillar of
state trading. <
c. State trading, nontransparency and foreign exchange constraints as further
elements impacting on CIS trade policies
State trading has been pervasive in CIS and is redressed but slowly: The term does
not only comprise central authorities but also local authorities and para-statals.
Indirectly, public authorities have maintained the right to control trading in
strategically important goods by regulating access to such markets. That means that
even if formally a state trading monopoly does no longer exist, state authorities have
their stakes in trading decisions. This is the case in the RF, Belarus and other CIS
states. Sustaining state trading is facilitated by unclear sharing of competence
between local and central authorities, by arbitrariness in deciding on the coverage of
strategically important goods, and by slow progress in privatisation. Definitely,
energy products, mineral resources, and processed ferrous and non-ferrous metals
belong to the core group of such goods (under the old perception of protecting
national resources). Under the current situation of lack of competitiveness in
manufactured goods, this core group accounts for the major part of CIS exports to
market economies. Therefore, state trading still dominates in CIS trade. Local
authorities in commodity-rich regions have benefited from higher prices paid for such
goods relative to manufactured goods by using them as a tax base. It is thus in their
interest to control market access in two ways, first by issuing export licences and
second by actively participating in trading with state-owned companies.
Furthermore, CIS states are still in search of a constitutionally binding division of
labour between central and local authorities. Such division of labour should deal with
access to financial resources as well as with the responsibility for supplying specific
public goods. It goes without saying that this problem is of paramount importance for
the RF with its eighty-nine entities [twenty-one autonomous republics, three of them
(Tartastan, Bashkortostan, and Chechen Republic) regard themselves as14
independent, eleven districts (okrugs), six regions (krays), forty-nine territories
(oblasts) and the two cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg]. While the draft
constitution fixing a strong position for the central authority of the President
successfully passed the referendum, the way of implementation is less clear. Forces
aiming at decentralisation and local access to resources can still point to the legal
base of the Federation Treaty of 31 March 1992 and other laws, for instance, on
natural resources (21 February 1992). The treaties comprised important competence
and sovereignties passed to the local authorities with respect to property rights on
natural resources and real estate as well as on rights to keep parts of royalties and
resource rents for local budgets. With the shift of intra-Russian income terms of trade
in favour of the formerly discriminated resource-rich areas and to the detriment of
industriarcentres in the Western part of the RF, such issues are still of crucial
political importance for the resource-generating capacity of regional entities. They
require clarification in the implementation process of the new constitution and have a
direct impact on foreign investment, trade and trade policies, as they comprise - as
mentioned above - the core group of tradable goods. The conditions of access to
such resources, the tax levels, and tax revenue sharing between local and central
authorities are important determinants of international competitiveness. The RF does
not stand alone in dealing with questions of federalism. Other CIS states with
regionally scattered natural resources such as the Ukraine face similar challenges.
Apart from pervasive state trading and nontransparency, foreign exchange
constraints are crucial. This problem has two different facets. First, all CIS states are
heavily indebted in rubles because of their dependence on Russian energy and their
terms of trade losses (rising import prices relative to their export prices). They cannot
pay their debts by issuing own soft non-convertible currencies which are not
accepted by the RF because they are not backed by internationally valuable
resources (hard currencies in cash, gold, valuable resources, or foreign credits). The
challenge to the RF has been the trade-off between preserving export and input
markets for Russian companies in other CIS and controlling inflation by stopping
ruble credit expansion. With the emergence of own currencies in CIS states, the RF
was required to convert implicit transfers (granted in the past by underpricing its
exports and overpricing its imports) into official credits, and it did so. During 1992,
the RF reported a trade surplus of over 150 bill, rubles and imposed credit limits after
July 1992. The discriminatory element of fixing credit lines more tightly for the
Ukraine and more generously for Kazakhstan, Belarus and other CIS has been
discussed above. Apart from political preferences, such differences have been
explained by stronger economic ties of Russian companies with the two latter states15
than with the Ukraine [DIW, Die wirtschaftliche Lage RuBlands, Dritter Bericht, 1993:
15].
The second facet relates to the availability of hard currencies. All CIS states are net
importers of capital and thus run a current account deficit with the outside world. This
is normal given the fact that domestic resource mobilisation in low-income countries
is usually far below domestic capital formation requirements. What distinguishes CIS
states from developing economies is that in the current stage both private risk capital
(foreign investment) and private loans are insignificantly available because of the
uncertainty related to the entire transformation process and because of defaults in
debt servicing. Capital flight is still important and underlines the lack of credibility of
the CIS residents toward the transformation process of the own countries. As in
developing economies, public external savings (foreign aid) fall short to compensate
for the lack of private external savings. Under such conditions, foreign 'exchange is
mainly generated by trade surpluses. The RF, in the first half of 1993, had a sizeable
trade surplus with non-CIS countries. It was on the one hand due to the higher
attractiveness of exporting commodities abroad than using them domestically or
exporting them to NIS. On the other hand, it was due to a squeeze of imports which
probably came as a result of reduced loans from OECD countries.
In allocating foreign exchange available, the heavy hand of the state authorities
remains visible. It is reported, for instance, that in 1992 about 45 per cent of Russian
imports from OECD countries was centrally handled by the government and widely
financed by bilateral import credits. As discussed above, such bilateralism leads to
regionally distorted trading patterns which are similar to what is known as tied aid in
development assistance. In 1993, foreign exchange has remained a scarce resource
as new loans were frozen due to lack of progress in the transformation process and
due to payment arrears. In early 1994, the IMF contributed to an importantxhange in
foreign donor's policies by releasing 1.5 bill. US$ based on wishful prospects rather
than actual performance. What gives rise to concern that as in 1992, capital flight
from the RF has continued to remain large. It is estimated that the capital drain
measured as credits to foreign accounts of Russian banks plus the balance of errors
and omissions might be as large in 1993 as in 1992 (about 13 bill. US$) [ibid: 16,
and footnote 29]. Other CIS states are in a similar situation as far as the importance
of export expansion for foreign exchange generation is concerned. However, smaller
low-income countries/for instance in Central Asia, might be better off than the RF as
concerns foreign exchange constraints: their import demand might be lower and
more price-elastic because their need to modernise the capital stock by importing16
Western technology might be not as urgent as in the large CIS states with their
obsolete physical capital stock.
III. Obstacles to Trade Policy Reforms in the Transition Period
1. Rent-seeking Behaviour
The political economy in general and public choice theory in particular offer useful
insight into the rationale of discretionary interventions and rent-seeking behaviour
underlying trade policies in CIS states. The key hypothesis is that behind the
normative term of protecting national resources, there are strong economic self-
interests ofjnembers of the nomenclatura to continue rent-seeking. Rent-seeking
has been a general means in central planning to generate income. This legacy is still
alive, as economic agents in general and the nomenclatura in particular are widely
unfamiliar with performance-oriented income generation either based on contractual
or residual income. Furthermore, with high uncertainty in the transformation process
and unbroken inflationary expectations, the time horizon is short. This leads to high
time preference rates, to priorities given to present consumption over future
consumption (investment), and to risk-averting behaviour. Nation-wide public
institutions are not yet available to lower transaction costs through enforcing property
rights. Private or semi-private institutions emerge as imperfect substitutes [see for
this important aspect Naishul, 1994]. Privatisation and deregulation has frequently
been delayed and hindered; the latter sometimes more than the former. This is
important as evidence from privatisation in developing countries suggests that
privatisation without deregulation is window-dressing: it is competition not ownership
which decides on allocative efficiency.
Well-established traditional relations between nomenclatura members managing
companies on one hand and policy-makers on the other hand serve as such
substitutes. So does personal knowledge as a collateral. Within such circles, the
allocation of quotas, permits and licences as well as the distribution of insider
information allows for the generation of resources and income. Illegal transactions
add to illegitimate activities such as the use of insider knowledge. The clear
preference for quantitative restrictions instead of pricing interventions signals that the
bureaucratic allocation of quotas and other QRs are adequate instruments which
guarantee that economic rents accrue to a priori targeted individuals and groups.
Such certainty would not be available if QRs were auctioned or replaced by direct
pricing interventions such as tariffs.17
While private benefits are generated and distributed within such circles, the economy
and the society as a whole incur severe macroeconomic losses because transaction
costs rise as a result of market segmentation and itransparency. As costs of
information and of disciplining outsiders rise with an increasing number of members
in such circles, there is a built-in tendency to keep such circles closed to outside
competition and limited to carefully selected participants. Economically, the size of
such circles therefore tends to be suboptimal compared to an institution protected
and enforced by generally valid laws enforcing property rights and public security.
Furthermore, participants concentrate on investing in so-called directly unproductive
activities in order to capture rents and/or to avoid the erosion of rents. A welfare-
enhancing selection process between different circles is impeded by such
investment geared to sustain intransparency and policy-induced hurdles. Again,
keeping transaction costs high, for instance, by opposing public auctioning of quotas,
follows economic rationale from the bureaucrat's or public manager's point of view as
it reduces competition and weakens selection processes.
CIS trade policies with their different layers of discrimination between sectors and
industries, countries, and, finally, companies contain the major ingredients of rent-
seeking behaviour applied in an institutional environment of disorder, discretion and
volatility. It is important to note that welfare losses due to inefficiencies dp not arise
because of the high degree of trade policy restrictions but because of the
segmentation of political and economic markets, the degree of intransparency and
the lack of predictability of the institutional environment.
2. Institutional Disorder in Controlling Internal and External Trade Flows
Public choice theory has often been criticised for blaming the wrong culprit. It is
argued that the existence of benevolent politicians and bureaucrats trying to produce
public goods is denied by public choice theory and that "natural" barriers explained
by the early stage of economic and institutional development are deliberately
underrated. If such normative conduct of politicians would be assumed to be relevant
in CIS states, a number of systemic obstacles against effective trade policies can
indeed be quoted. They would arise even if rent-seeking behaviour would not play a
major role.
Trade policies, for instance, require a minimum of operational institutions which do
not exist within the CIS states. Customs areas with clearly defined borders,
authorities enforcing internationally accepted; customs valuation practices, and tax
authorities collecting tariff revenues are not yet existing in the CIS. Given such lack,18
CIS states are still treated by their trading partners as if they were one single
customs area. This is witnessed by the recently levied aluminium quota of the EC
imposed upon all former Soviet Union republics as an entity. Thereby, the EC pays
tribute to the fact that under the current conditions customs areas of individual CIS
states can neither be identified nor isolated from other CIS states. Borders are widely
open and transit trade via neighbouring CIS states is the rule. Customs controls
which were announced by the Russian government and brought into operation at
least at western borders can easily be circumvented. Such openness has important
implications for the effectiveness of reform efforts of individual CIS states. Any
national trade policy reform could easily become undermined and jeopardised if
open customs borders could not be controlled and if neighbouring states would
operafe a widely different trade policy.
3. Incoherence in Balancing Different Objectives of Trade Policies
Trade policies usually aim at balancing a number of different objectives, such as to
provide infant protection, generate budget revenues, improve income distribution
and alleviate balance of payments pressures. One should also add a side condition:
trade policies should not distort an efficient allocation of resources. Some of these
objectives are conflicting: while, for instance, the first three objectives would be more
easily achieved by a sectorally differentiated tariff or quota structure, the balance of
payments objective would call for a uniform tariff or quota structure, for instance an
across-the-board import surcharge, to approximate an exchange rate depreciation
aimed at reducing imports. However, such a rate violates the important side
condition as it discriminates between import-competing industries and exports.
It goes without saying that balancing different objectives is difficult even in market
economies, but at least in these economies objectives are often made public and the
instrumental character of trade policies can be assessed. Such assessment is
entirely impossible in CIS states. It is normatively unclear which objectives should be
followed, and it is probably positively impossible to design a rationale trade policy
under the current situation of institutional disorder, ad hoc interventions, and
inconsistent policy packages. The latter aspect is of particular importance as shown
by the following example which reflects the Russian situation. When inflationary
expectations coincide with large distortions of relative goods and factor prices,
pervasive quantitative restrictions, and flexible nominal exchange rates, the real
exchange rate depreciates more than the medium-term purchasing power parity rate
indicates (overshooting). In addition, a large degree of volatility is introduced. In this
situation, export incentives exist, at least theoretically. If CIS trade policies should
provide a neutral incentive system between the import-competing sector and exports19
and to prevent foreigners (including CIS residents with foreign bank accounts!) from
capturing resource rents, authorities should impose taxes on exports and remove
the exemption of intra-CIS imports from the VAT. Export quotas which are not
auctioned (as it is the case in CIS) cannot achieve this target of neutrality. Nor can
export taxes if they are not levied on intra-CIS exports, too. In the past, Russian
commodities were often exported to other CIS states and then reexported profitably
to Western markets. Such conduct signals that Russian trade policies failed to
collect the rents for the budget. While in some cases the quota system may have
offset the export advantages arising from the exchange rate, it is probably true that
in many cases the system was only instrumental to generate private rents even if this
was not politically intended.
It is difficult to decide which of the two proposed explanations for the inefficiency of
the system (rent-seeking versus "natural" barriers) carries more weight.
Undoubtedly, "natural" barriers against a consistent and transparent trade policy do
exist in each CIS state. The legacy of central planning is unique even compared to
CEECs. Furthermore, there is the low level of economic development in many CIS
states and the lack of publicly reliable and accepted institutions, the complexity of
unsolved institutional, political and economic issues, the degree of physical and
intellectual isolation from Western socio-economic systems, the dependence of
smaller CIS states on decisions taken in the RF which they cannot influence, and,
finally, the internal conflicts and contradictions in policy-making within the RF. Each
of these impediments is a crucial barrier against rapid reform progress. In sum, they
may even constitute a deadlock situation. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that just those policies are deliberately introduced which
preserve intransparency and market segmentation in order to protect rent-seeking
behaviour. Many nomenclatura members are actively participating in political
markets both on the demand and on the supply side. In this respect, trade policies
do not lack economic rationale from the individual economic agent's point of view
and from the view of closed circles. However, the lack of intra-and extra-CIS
competition between such circles and the lack of power (or will) of public authorities
to supply collective goods contribute to inefficiency. Private institutions have
emerged as "spontaneous social inventions" (von Hayek) but their behaviour is not
disciplined by competition, and they are not (yet) subject to a selection process.20
IV. Cross-Road Decisions in Designing New Trade Policies
1. Trade Policies in Transformation Economies: The Importance of Taxing
International Transactions in the Infant Stage of Market Reforms
The discussion of current CIS trade policies has highlighted that these policies are ill-
fated and provide misguidance in the transformation process. They have contributed
to distortions instead of removing them. Markets have become more segmented and
price signals more invisible. Promising policy reforms in other sectors (capital and
labour markets, fiscal and monetary policies) are threatened to be paralysed if trade
policies are excluded from reforms. The theoretical underpinnings of such links are
found in welfare economics: the deviation from the welfare optimum may become
even larger if policy reforms in different sectors are pursued except for one sector
which escapes reforms. Such a bottleneck sector can be the goods sector in which
trade policies serve as the tool to tax cross border sales and purchases. Trade
policies determine a. number of important price signals: the absolute level of the
domestic price of tradables through the nominal tariff protection rate, the difference
between the world market price and domestic price of tradables (implicit protection),
the effective protection enjoyed by stages of production (value added) if nomina!
protection rates differ by stages of production, the real exchange rate if we assume
the price of non-tradables to be constant, and, finally, the size of the tradable sector
relative to the non-tradable sector depending on whether tariffs or QRs are applied.
In transformation economies, domestic economic transactions are difficult to tax
because of the lack of prerequisites [insufficiently large tax base, weak tax
authorities, lack of property rights to tax stocks (fortune) rather than flows (income)].
This is why taxing cross-border transactions has an important role to play.
• It can provide for more allocative efficiency by approaching domestic prices to
world market prices which are assumed to reflect relative scarcities (signal
function).
• It is likely to contribute to the largest part of budget revenues in the early stage
given the lack of access to direct taxation (revenue generation).
• It may improve the distribution of personal income by taxing consumers of luxury
goods more than consumers of essential goods (income distribution).
• It may protect domestic infant sectors unless better instruments (prefinancing of
externalities through capital markets, production subsidies) are available (infant
industry protection).21
• It may alleviate balance of payments pressures by using import tariffs as a
variable buffer against imports as long as the exchange rate does not meet this
target and as long as there are no international commitments (binding of tariffs
within the GATT framework) to refrain from such policies (balance of payments
improvement).
• In the rare case of a large country affecting the world price of imports, it can
improve the country's terms of trade by imposing positive tariffs on products for
which it has monopsony power and zero tariffs for all other commodities
(optimum tariff argument).
As mentioned above, some of these objectives are conflicting and some are much
better achieved by other domestic policy instruments. But as in developing
economies, transformation economies usually do not have many policy options
available at the beginning of the process, and taxing international transactions is one
of the most easily accessible tools. This is why the appropriate design of trade
policies is crucially important, perhaps more important in small open economies with
a large tradable sector such as the Central Asian and Caucasian CIS states than in
the RF. But even the RF is economically "small" in the sense that it cannot influence
world prices of its imports.
2. The Role of Trade Policies in Timing and Sequencing
a. Defining the customs area
Any national trade policy requires the definition of customs borders and customs
areas. This process is not yet completed in the CIS states. Intra-CIS and extra-CIS
trade flows are treated somewhat differently but there is no official preferential
trading arrangement, no free trade area with specification of rules of origin, and no
customs union with a common external trade policy. Declarations given at CIS
summits concerning co-operation in an economic community are vague and without
substance. Implementing policies with respect to intra-CIS trade relations often
appears inconsistent and contradictory. Russian imports from other CIS, for
instance, are exempted from import tariffs and VAT while strict controls still continue
to exist for exports. There are a number of arguments in case of nationally
autonomous trade policies in line with nationally autonomous monetary policies. Very
importantly, clarity is improved and national trade policies can be used to implement
different national policy objectives and to adjust to different economic structures.
Should countries decide to merge economically, for instance, by accepting the22
Russian ruble as the sole legal tender, national trade policies would have to be
revised in the light of a customs union or at least free trade area with the RF.
b. Accepting the instrumental character of national trade policies
Trade policies are instruments to achieve policy targets. Which targets should be
achieved in individual CIS states is not clear. Protection of domestic industries,
export promotion, and revenue generation are three possible targets which might
require different trade policies. To maximise revenues, for instance, tariffs schedules
should theoretically be designed according to different price elasticities of demand
(low tariffs on products with elastic demand, higher tariffs on products facing inelastic
demand). However, such differentiated tariffs are very difficult to implement in an
early stage of "institutional maturity", and they usually conflict with the target of
neutral protection which means that there should be no discrimination between
import-competing industries. This holds as differentiated nominal tariffs with tariff
levels selected on grounds of price elasticities would lead to higher effective than
nominal protection and to higher protection of finished goods industries than of
intermediates (the former usually facing higher price elasticities than the latter).
Thus, following the revenue target might lead to the same pattern of inefficient import
substitution in industries close to the consumers as in many developing countries in
the sixties and seventies. It is well known that the target of revenue generation plays
an important role in low-income countries with weak tax administration and with an
insufficient base for direct taxation or for taxing national instead of international
transactions. Therefore, some low-income CIS states, for instance in Central Asia or
in the Caucasian region, could be tempted to operate domestic trade policies
basically under the target or revenue generation, either by issuing differentiated tariff
schedules or by auctioning quotas with the same effect of large spreads of tariff
equivalents. Given the early stage of institutional reforms, there is still scope for
avoiding an inadequate focus on fiscal objectives. The first-best solution would be to
;
develop domestic revenue sources (VAT, excise taxes, sales taxes, taxes on income
or fortune), the second-best to meet the revenue target by minimising tariff spreads
or even by taxing imports uniformly. The same reluctance to use trade policies as an
instrument for targets other than import protection and export promotion seems
advisable with respect to income distribution and balance of payments purposes.
Income distribution targets should be approached by domestic policy measures
(income transfers and subsidies) while balance of payments targets should be
achieved by exchange rate flexibility instead of trade policies such as import
surcharges or export subsidies. Paying attention to such principles, would leave
protection or export promotion as the major targets of trade policies.23
c. Achieving exchange rate stabilisation: an important companion piece to
successful trade policies
Assuming the protection target has been accepted as the major yardstick of CIS
trade policies, the effectiveness of such policies crucially depends on how CIS states
manage to remove the misallocation signals of excessive currency undervaluation.
Such signals have a number of negative side effects. They excessively reduce
domestic absorption, foster commodity-biased dumping of exports to world markets
(provoking retaliation measures from the partner countries' side) and delink the
economies from Western capital goods imports which are indispensable for capital
stock modernisation and technology catch-up. In doing so, they also impede import
liberalisation and encourage the governments to bridge the gap between low
domestic prices and high international prices for exportables by imposing quotas on
exports. Quota regulation would soon lose its rationale if exchange rates would
realign to purchasing power parity levels. In short, launching domestic price reforms
and breaking inflationary expectations appear as the most important prerequisites of
successful trade policy reforms by stabilising the exchange rate.
3. Trade Policies in Operation
Cornerstones and trade-offs do not only exist between trade policies and other policy
measures and targets but also within trade policies and their specific tools. Again, as
newcomers in the international arena of trade diplomacy, CIS states are not
constrained by the heritage of long-standing traditions. Instead, they can choose
tools appropriate to achieve special targets. Such targets can be economically
formulated, such as export expansion and export diversification towards non-
traditional goods, or institutionally, such as MFN treatment by partner countries or
GATT membership. Whatever targets are chosen, trade policy instruments should be
administratively simple (given the early stage of institutional maturity in NIS) and
designed in a sequence looking several years ahead.
a. The concrete target: export expansion accompanied by export diversification
To start with economic targets, export expansion and diversification towards any
partner country offering hard currency earnings, appear as a prime target worth to be
followed by the CIS states for several reasons. First, CIS states seriously lack foreign
exchange to stabilise the exchange rate and to ease the hard budget constraint with
respect to external savings. Such constraint exist as CIS states are not creditworthy
in international loan markets. Nor do they attract foreign direct investment at a large
scale. Foreign public aid cannot compensate for the reluctance of international
investors and private donors. Therefore, access to external savings is very much24
limited and can be eased only by squeezing imports or expanding exports. Given the
disenchanting experience of many developing countries with the former way and the
decline Jn production incurred because of reducing capital goods imports, only the
latter way is advisable. Second, export diversification helps to release CIS from
exogenous commodity price shocks and from concurrent exchange rate volatility
(Dutch disease problem). It stabilises flows of export earnings. Third, export
diversification is instrumental to. link domestic producers to international networking
and to acquire technological and commercial skills. Fourth, export diversification
contributes to shift CIS production towards sectors facing a more income elastic
export demand than commodities. Fifth, it may ease political tensions between CIS
states which could arise if the countries would underbid each other in homogeneous
commodity markets (either by "devaluation races" or export subsidisation). The
experience with African commodity exporters suggests such competition to be very
likely.
Trade with partner countries offering payment in non-convertible currencies, for
instance, other CIS states, can be handled through bilateral or multilateral payments
and clearing arrangements in order to save transaction costs in hard currencies.
However, the disenchanting experience with such arrangements in Latin America
and Sub-Saharan Africa suggests such savings to be low and clearly underlines the
crucial role of net creditors in such arrangements. They must be prepared to issue
credits or accept assets in their portfolio which are inferior to hard currencies. Hence,
there seems little to expect from such arrangements in intra-CIS trade which is
dominated by the net creditor role of the RF.
b. The tools: tariffs instead of quotas; measures more on the import than on the
export side; more tariff uniformity than tariff differentiation
The early state of administrative capacity in CIS states suggests that all tools should
be conditioned by simplicity, transparency and conformity with the market
mechanism. This requires to phase,out quotas as soon as possible. Quotas if not
auctioned clearly violate the principle to discourage rent-seeking activities and to
avoid "investment" in unproductive activities such as"bribirtgV^Auttitariihg quotas is
inferior to tariffs for administrative as well as theoretical reasons, there are few
exceptions which emerge exogeneously. Quotas; for exports of multi-fibre products,
for instance, should be auctioned in order to enabfe CIS governments to cbllect the
quota rents which would accrue to domestic producers if quotas wbuid be allocated
on non-price grounds (e.g. "first come, first served" principle or other bureaucratic
principles). Still, the question arises whether the principle of abandoning quotas
should be applied to total foreign trade of CIS states including intra-CIS trade. This25
question is open to debate. In 1992, Tarr and Michalopoulos [1992:10] have argued
in favour of transitional arrangements in favour of intra-CIS quotas for those products
which could be reexported by importing CIS because of domestic underpricing
relative to world market prices. The case against such arrangements is based on the
fear that quotas could proliferate and extend rather than shorten the transition
process. Again taxes appear as the preferable tool. However, with monetary
disintegration proceeding rapidly within the CIS region and with similar trends
emerging in the real sector the ultimate target should be for each CIS state to treat
intra-CIS trade and extra-CIS trade equally. This target which would also meet the
administrative criteria of simplicity and transparency which should be achieved as
soon as possible. It would not preclude preferential relations in a later period but the
principle of non-discrimination should have short-run priority. Future institutional re-
integration would be facilitated if the tariff schedules of the individual CIS states
would be similar arid as uniform as possible. Thus, the cross-road situation of
discrimination versus non-discrimination should be answered in favour of non-
discrimination.
Export taxes versus import taxes are another cross-road decision. In a transitional
period, in which few commodities still present the bulk of exports in many CIS states
and in which domestic prices for such commodities are still lower than world market
prices, there are good arguments for maintaining such export taxes temporarily.
They provide revenues easy to collect and do not impede forward contracts.
Domestic price reforms and export diversification will make them redundant, and
then the main thrust of tariff policies should come from pricing measures on the
import side.
Having agreed on such principles, both the level and the structure of import tariffs
have to be discussed as a next step. As concerns the level of import protection, the
revenue argument is likely to play an important role. Recent experiences with tariff
reforms in developing economies support the view that a tariff structure with three to
five bands (the number of tariff levels for broad categories of goods) and with a
maximum tariff between 15 and 20 per cent but no greater than 25 to 30 per cent
would be recommendable [Thomas, Nash and Associates, 1991; Subramaniam,
Ibrahim and Torres-Castro, 1993]. Such rules of thumb are theoretically
unsatisfactory but meet the important condition of simplicity. CIS governments might
prefer much higher levels for revenue reasons but they should be reminded of the
experience in developing economies that tariff collection rates (ratio of tariff revenues
and import expenditure; sometimes also called ad valorem incidence of tariffs)
decrease with rising tariff levels [Tymowski, 1987: 99]. This is not only caused by26
high price elasticity in demand and domestic supply of import-competing goods. One
may also argue that high peak tariffs give rise to rent-seeking activities to exonerate
considerable shares of imports from import taxes (for instance, through privileged
treatment in investment codes, or duty-free entry for imports under government
procurement or for priority projects in development plans). Therefore, it is important
to convey the message that high levels of import tariffs are unlikely to result in high
customs receipts but will encourage unproductive rentrseeking.. So would large tariff
spreads as import-competing industries facing low tariff protection would claim for
the same protection as those industries enjoying high tariff protection. Uniform tariffs
make such claims redundant. In general, the revenue argument would be of minor
relevance if CIS states would succeed to strengthen the domestic tax base.
To promote export expansion, however, the rule of import tariff uniformity has be
broken somewhat. This could be done, for instance, by exempting those imported
inputs from taxation which are used for exports. This measure could be followed by
further measures such as various rebate schemes, bonded warehouses, and duty
waivers subject to evidence of subsequent exports [see for a further discussion with
respect to the compatibility of such measures with the IMF principle of unified
exchange rates Keesing, 1979: 235 seq.]. Finally, export processing zones would
also be instrumental to create a pro-export bias provided that the gap between policy
conditions in the zone and the rest of the economy is not too large. All schemes have
in common that they depart from the assumption that imports of intermediates can
be compartmentalised into those used for producing importables and those in
exportables (and non-tradables). If such segmentation could not be achieved in the
CIS states, direct export subsidies,seem preferable to lowering intermediate tariffs
on the import side if export expansion would still be envisaged.
c. CIS trade policy regimes and the international trading order
To integrate CIS into the international trading order, is an important precondition for
the success of the entire transformation process for two reasons. First, it enhances
the credibility of the transformation process for all economic agents by committing
CIS trade policies to internationally binding rules and thus by tying the hands of CIS
governments to alter policies ad hoc. Domestic opposition against trade liberalisation
can be disciplined if the violation of such commitments would carry costs for the CIS
economies in terms of worsened access to foreign markets and external savings.
Both domestic and foreign investment are expected to respond positively to such
commitments. Second, it increases transparency and lowers transaction costs
concerning tariff schedules, customs valuation practices and other important rules of
international trading.27
Again, cross-road decisions have to be taken.
First, CIS have to decide whether they want to maintain discriminatory treatment by
differentiating tariffs between intra-CIS trade and extra-CIS trade. The alternative is
MFN treatment. As discussed already above, there is a number of arguments pro
MFN treatment in a forward-looking view while the status quo may speak pro tariff
differentiation.
Economically, there is much evidence from the experiences of many developing
economies (regional preferential trading arrangements, GSTP) and preferential
trading regimes in OECD countries (GSP, special preferences as the Lome
Convention or the Caribbean Basin Preferences) that differentiated tariffs are not the
adequate means to stimulate trade. Instead, they are a second-best alternative to
aid transfers (provided that tariff revenues foregone accrue to the beneficiary). They
are more conducive to divert trade to less efficient suppliers than to create trade at
the expense of inefficient domestic suppliers. If conditions of so-called "natural"
trading partnership exist (i.e, if geographical proximity and complementarity in
resources foster neighbourhood trade), neighbourhood trade will develop anyway
without preferences.
Administratively, differentiated tariffs require strict controls over market segmentation
by checking rules of origin. Such control mechanism are not available in CIS states
and there are reasons to assume that to invest in them would be unproductive. Very
often, such rules have proven to be protectionist instruments to limit the value of
preferences if there was such a value. Again, for the sake of simplicity and
transparency and to minimise bureaucratic red tape, CIS should not embark on such
policies of market segmentation. In the short run, intra-CIS trade will continue to
benefit anyway from traditional inter-company links, close geographic proximity, and
infrastructural constraints (transportation networks). To some extent, they are likely
to be "natural" trading partners. At least it will take time to decouple such ties even if
they are not economically viable.
Institutionally, it appears much easier for the CIS to join the GATT framework if they
commit themselves to strict MFN treatment in their trade policies. This holds as non-
discrimination is still the major pillar of the GATT notwithstanding the options which
contracting parties "in the stage of development" can use to apply for special and
differential treatment under the 1979 Enabling Clause. There is some evidence that
such treatment has often been a Pyrrhic victory for developing countries as it
detracted policies from the target of efficient resource allocation. It goes without
saying that anchoring MFN treatment in CIS trade policies has nothing, to do with28
privileged treatment of CIS exports by OECD member states or extending the
individual OECD countries' schemes of the generalised system of trade preferences
to CIS exports. Such treatment would be a unilateral concession which does not
require reciprocity from CIS countries. One should, however, be cautious to engage
in preferential trading arrangements with non-CIS states such as a Black Sea
Preferential Trading Area or entering existing schemes like the ECO (Economic Co-
operation Organization: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan). Again, the experience of developing
economies suggests low progress, lots of distributional conflicts, and high costs of
market segmentation. On the other hand, there is little to argue against regional co-
operation (for example, a Black Sea Economic Co-operation) to economise on joint
production of goods of common interest (inter-country transportation networks) or to
co-ordinate national policies which refer to cross-border mobile resources (joint
marine resource management, for instance). Regional trade integration should
clearly be distinguished from regional economic co-operation.
The second cross-road decision to be taken refers to tariff binding versus unilateral
reversible tariff cuts. Again, the experience of developing economies is worth
recalling. Irrespective of the Uruguay Round negotiations, many economies removed
NTBs and lowered tariffs unilaterally during 1986 and 1991, as part of structural
adjustment programmes but also independently from external pressure [GATT,
1991]. Often, the idea of receiving "credit" for such unilateral endeavours has been
an important motive. It may reflect the disenchanting experience of many contracting
parties that their bargaining power in the GATT is not high because of mercantilist
behaviour of large partner countries and the importance of the "principal supplier
rule" (negotiations are made preferably with those countries from which one can
expect the maximum of counter concessions in exchange of own concessions). As
many of such unilateral cuts exceed the one third tariff cut target of the Uruguay
Round, the "bound" rates are higher than the actual rates charged. Thus, the
contracting parties would have still options to raise tariffs without violating
commitments or having to compensate partner countries.
For the CIS states, "binding" a specific level of tariffs would be helpful to establish
confidence and credibility in the international arena concerning the seriousness of
reform commitments. Furthermore, it would facilitate and accelerate negotiations on
accession to the GATT. Together with the MFN commitment, it would be an
important element of reducing the volatility in the reform process of many CIS states.
Early binding could also contribute to the stability of a uniform tariff structure. It
depends on the level of bound tariffs and the time when binding is announced
whether there would still be scope for raising actual tariffs. Assume that binding is29
announced simultaneously with the introduction of an import tariff schedule, this
must not necessarily mean that CIS governments would lose the instrument of tariff
increases under emergency conditions. Imposing surcharges under the appropriate
balance of payments provisions of the GATT would still be legal even if tariffs are
bound. .
Overall, both cross-road decisions concerning the international perspective, should
be taken with the crucially important objective to inject stability, credibility, and
predictability into the trade policy regimes of the CIS states. International
commitments such as MFN treatment and tariff binding are important transmission
mechanisms to achieve this target.
V. The Specificity of the NIS
In the preceding chapters the experience of developing economies with trade policy
reforms has. often been quoted as a possible yardstick for reforms in the CIS states.
In the same vein, one might refer to trade policies of the transformation economies in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), in particular to the three forerunners, the
former Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. To some.extent, such reference may
be subject to qualifications even if economic arguments and "fundamentals" are
generally valid. As concerns developing economies, they either inherited basic
elements of a trade policy regime from the colonial period (Sub-Saharan Africa, parts
of Asia) or had a long-standing tradition of political sovereignty (Latin America). What
is called "reforms" in these countries, are changes to remove distortions but not a
brand-new design. CEECs are closer to the CIS but they still deviate widely from the
latter in terms of maturity of nation building and the degree of national consensus
(public goods), currency autonomy and stability, links to OECD countries which are
often neighbours, conceptual clarity in sequencing reform strategies, the extent of
support from OECD countries and the institutional capacity to absorb such support,
and, finally, infrastructural prerequisites. By all standards, CIS states seem more
handicapped than the CEECs, not to speak of developing economies. The CIS
states are the only economies which in this century had no experience at all with
market mechanism. They are expected to install market-driven economic institutions
"from the scratch" against rent-seeking behaviour on one hand and lack of
knowledge on the other hand. Initial costs of learning by trial and error are high
though marginal costs are expected to become soon lower than average costs.
Economic, institutional and political instability act as barriers to trade liberalisation as
the unprecedented decline in real income. Beyond rent-seeking behaviour and
powerful coalitions of potential losers, there are widely spread hostile perceptions30
against selling the "national heritage" (commodities and land) abroad and becoming
dependent on imported technology. As a result, liberalising foreign trade may be
associated by many CIS politicians and citizens more with "unequal exchange" and
unemployment than with welfare increase. Capital inflows may face the same
perceptions. Such normative barriers are important as they create an atmosphere
which is contrary to the "developmental state" catch-up atmosphere which has often
been quoted as an important aspect of success in East Asia.
However, there are also some objective barriers which are unique in the CIS region
and give rise to caution as concerns rapid progress in the implementation of national
trade policies along the lines discussed above.
To mention three of them, except for the RF, the Ukraine, and Georgia, all CIS states
are land-locked and many CIS states are isolated from the main international trade-
routes and transport trunks. Such remoteness does not only raise "natural" rates of
protection in terms of high transportation costs. It also requires special transit
arrangements, as well as bonded ware-houses, duty-free storage facilities, and
transshipment areas in foreign harbours and airports. In the developing world, such
arrangements have sometimes become vulnerable to conflicts (as, for instance,
between Kenya and Uganda or Chile and Bolivia). At least, they raise transaction
costs and require international reliable agreements. For the land-locked CIS states,
the RF and the Ukraine appear as main transit countries in the short run. This
important role of the two countries may induce the land-locked states not to choose
an entirely different trade policy compared to the transit countries in order to
minimise the incentives of smuggling, tariff evasion and other illegal activities. This
holds the more as, unlike in developing economies with their relatively low intra-area
trade, intra-CIS trade will remain important for many small CIS states. Exploiting
price differentials through smuggling will nevertheless remain an important factor to
discipline national trade policies and to induce convergence of national tariffs rates
rather than divergence.
Second, the dependence on energy imports from the RF and on Russian technology
embodied in capital goods imports cannot be dismantled in the short run. There are
infrastructural bottlenecks which tie CIS net importers to Russian sources. Again, the
degree of such dependence seems unique and may not even be compared to post-
colonial trading ties, say between France and the francophone Sub-Saharan African
countries. For many CIS states, therefore, the RF constitutes a "large country" case
which could mean that the RF in a strategic trade policy approach imposes optimal
export taxes to improve its terms of trade. In doing so, it might force the other CIS31
states to lower their import taxes on these goods and to seek for compensation by
raising other import taxes, for instance in "non-essential" consumer goods including
food. As a result, the import tax-raising capacity of many CIS states could be
affected and the target of uniformity in import taxes could be missed. Furthermore, a
discriminatory distinction between "essential" imports from the RF and "non-
essential" imports from non-CIS sources could emerge and thus lead to the violation
of the non-discrimination principle. Viewed from the Russian side, such strategy
would be risky as long-term elasticities of demand and supply tend to be much
higher than in the short run. CIS net importers would accelerate their efforts to
reduce energy intensity in domestic production and to find substitutes to Russian
goods. In cases where a retaliatory potential exists, terms of trade gains may not
play an important role in strategic trade policies. But nevertheless, the "large
country" case might constitute an argument for intra-CIS trade policy co-ordination
and impede national autonomy in trade policies.
r
Third, doubts were raised above with respect to the macroeconomic benefits of
preferential treatment conceded by OECD countries. Yet, in a single beneficiary
point of view, such preferences might nevertheless be valuable in some "sensitive"
quota-restricted items, for instance for outward processing quotas in clothing. Yet, to
receive such benefits, requires a clearly defined customs territory in order to enforce
rules of origin. Without such market separation, donors would either deny national
quotas or extend quotas to the entire territory of the former USSR. The two points
discussed above suggest that individual CIS states might face much more difficulties
to be accepted as an identifiable "partner country" than most of the developing
economies and the CEECs.
VI. Conclusions
By the first quarter of 1994, the obstacles against implementing a rational and
operational trade policy of individual CIS states are paramount. Macroeconomic
policies in general are in severe disorder, and trade policies as an essential part of
the overall macropolicy framework are strongly affected. This holds not only for
countries involved in internal or border conflicts such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Tajikistan. It is relevant for the RF and especially for all CIS states
which have to accept the dominant role of the RF. Since 1991, all countries failed to
draw a clear distinction between domestic trade and intra-CIS trade. Recent
developments have made this failure even clearer. The possibility of a politically
driven renaissance of the ruble zone cannot be excluded even if such a zone would
imply a larger burden to be shouldered by the RF. The zone would include all CIS32
states which failed to delink from the RF in real and monetary terms. Monetary re-
integration can be expected, however, to strongly impede the introduction and
implementation of national trade policies. Instead, a monetary union with the RF will
pave the way towards free trade areas with the RF which would also decide on the
design of a common trade policy. Even if monetary autonomy and a national
currency could be preserved, there are few options for the CIS states to implement a
trade policy which strongly differs from the trade policy of the RF. Dependence on
transit trade via RF territory, trading through RF ports, and the sustained role of the
RF as the major donor, sourcing market and export market suggest national trade
policy to follow closely the RF policy track as long as alternative links are not yet
available. This would expose smaller CIS states to ail sorts of exogeneous and
endogeneous shocks facing the RF. Furthermore, provided the RF opts for a trade
policy as stylised above, other CIS states would have to follow even if their resource
endowment would call for different policies. For instance, CIS states specialising in
the production of finished goods such as Belarus, might prefer a higher initial
average tariff level than the RF specialising in intermediates or capital goods. Yet,
close ties to the RF might rule out such different policy tracks, and with a customs
union following a monetary union, such differences would be fully wiped out.
Thus, the elements of a new trade policy discussed above primarily hold for the RF
rather than for those CIS states being dependent on the RF in real and/or monetary
terms. They include the dismantling of quantitative restrictions and the introduction of
tariffs with few bands at a moderate level, the phasing out of export taxes, binding of
tariffs, MFN treatment, and export diversification as a target of trade policies. It is of
utmost importance that credibility, simplicity and predictability serve as major guiding
principles of a new trade policy. Whether or not such principles are followed by the
RF government is still open as this depends on the overall transformation process
and the political will to start it. Irrespective of this will, there is room for a sceptical
view. Economic history has taught that large resource-rich countries have often
relied on a much less liberal and transparent trade policy than small resource-poor
countries. It would be a dismal situation for the smaller resource-poor CIS countries
if - because of their unbroken ties to the RF - they could not decouple from an
inward-oriented restrictive trade policy of the RF.33
Appendix Table 1 - Share of Interrepublican Imports (M) and Exports (X) in Domestic Consumption (C) and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Statisticeskij Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh Gosudarstv, Statisticeskij Bjulletenj, 15 (33), August
1993, Moskva, p. 36-40.35



















































































































Source: Statisticeskij Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh Gosudarstv, Statisticeskij Bjulletenj, 15 (33), August
1993, Moskva, p. 28-29.
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Source: Statisticeskij Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh Gosudarstv, Statisticeskij BjuUetenj, 15 (33), August
1993, Moskva, p. 30-31.
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Source: Statisticeskij Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh Gosudarstv, Statisticeskij Bjulletenj, 15 (33), August
1993, Moskva, p. 32-33.
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Source: Statisticcskij Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh Gosudarstv, Statisticeskij Bjulletenj, 15 (33), August
1993, Moskva, p. 34-35.39
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